NEED A RIDE? UBER: THE TRENDY
CHOICE THAT COULD TURN
THREATENING
Emily L. Dyer*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 240
I.
REVOLUTIONIZING THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO TRANSPORTATION-NETWORK COMPANIES ........... 241
II.
UBER DRIVERS REJOICE! HOW NEVADA EVENTUALLY LEGALIZED
TRANSPORTATION-NETWORKING COMPANIES .................................... 243
III.
WITH GREAT LEGALIZATION COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY:
SAFETY CONCERNS FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS .............................. 246
A. Different Requirements for Essentially the Same Service............ 247
B. What Have Uber Drivers Done? .................................................. 252
IV.
NEVADA’S UNIQUE POPULATION DESERVES SAFE RIDES FROM
SAFE DRIVERS ..................................................................................... 254
A. Uber Driver Background Checks Should Require
Fingerprinting .............................................................................. 255
B. Video Recording in Vehicles Can Protect Both Drivers and
Passengers ................................................................................... 258
1. Constitutional problems with cameras in Uber cars ............. 261
C. Safety-Alert Buttons Should Be Available on the Uber App ........ 266
V.
UBER HAS THE MONEY, SO WHAT’S STOPPING IT FROM
IMPLEMENTING THESE SUGGESTIONS? ................................................ 268
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 271

* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2017, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I would like to thank my family and closest friends for their support and encouragement: Mom, Dad, Josh, Adam, Rachel, Sydney, Nikhail, Sarah, Cody, Stefany, Chelsea, Adrienne, Kristen, Yasnai, Brad, Chase, Taylor, and Mackenzie. Additionally, this note
would not have been possible without the guidance of Professor Rebecca L. Scharf and the
assistance of the entire Volume 17 staff of the Nevada Law Journal. Thank you.

239

240

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:239

INTRODUCTION
Imagine this all-too-common scenario: almost every Saturday night, a
group of girlfriends take a taxi to their favorite Las Vegas bar. It is a routine
they rely on with confidence. But one night, a member of the group starts to
feel sick and decides to head home early. Not wanting to ruin the other girls’
fun, she reassures them she will just grab a cab home—no worries! As she
walks out of the bar and begins to look for a cab, she realizes there are no yellow cars in sight. After some time, she remembers a friend gave her a “free
ride” code for Uber. She downloads the app, inputs the code, and finds a car
just a few blocks away. She sighs with relief as the car pulls up in front of her.
While her mind is preoccupied with her queasy stomach, she jumps in, assuming that the car is the Uber she ordered. Like too many around the country recently, this girl did not make it home safe and sound.
Now rewind back to the moment before she jumped into a stranger’s car
and ask yourself: Would you want your best friend to enter a barely marked car
driven by someone who committed a sexual offense or whose dismissed murder charge slipped through the cracks of a commercial background check?
Would you want your mother to get into a stranger’s car whose fingerprints are
not documented, or with a driver who could have created a false identity, now
with the ability to disappear easily without a trace? How about your daughter,
sister—or even yourself? The presumption of a safe and predictable cab ride is
fleeting when you enter an unmarked, private car, potentially driven by an insufficiently screened driver, with no safeguards available during the ride. This
story is all too real, as countless accusations, charges, and convictions of Uber
drivers continue to occur all around the world.
If the legislators, regulators, and private companies at the forefront of this
issue continue to fail to create strict safety standards, the less attractive Uber
becomes.1 But if Nevada applies to Uber its pre-existing taxi provisions, with
the eventual implementation of safety measures like fingerprint background
checks, SOS buttons, and cameras, passengers could have the confidence to fully utilize Uber’s many benefits.
Uber will surely upset the taxicab monopoly and will change the outdated
practice of always taking taxicabs in Nevada, but regardless of Uber’s benefits,
protecting citizen safety must be paramount. Part I of this note introduces how
transportation-networking companies have changed the transportation market.
Part II highlights Uber’s long journey to legality in Nevada and the public safety concerns that Nevada’s regulations have failed to tackle. Part III addresses
1

NAT’L ASS’N OF PROF’L BACKGROUND SCREENERS, BACKGROUND SCREENING—PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 2–3, https://www.omnidataretrieval.com/docs/industrynews/History
BackgroundScreening.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EM2-TY99] (“[N]egative publicity associated
with negligent hiring—especially as the result of a less than thorough background check—
can devastate the very foundation of a trusted organization.”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
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background check standards for transportation-network companies in Nevada
in comparison to Nevada taxicab standards. Part IV discusses three possible solutions to help counter the current lax requirements in Nevada. Finally, Part V
considers the monetary realities of the suggestions presented in Part IV.
I.

REVOLUTIONIZING THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO TRANSPORTATION-NETWORK COMPANIES

It is nearly impossible to go a day without using modern technology. Since
the invention of the smartphone, users have become accustomed to an almost
instantaneous answer to any problem.2 And while traditional means of transportation have become more convenient, the recent combination of transportation
and technology has revolutionized daily routines and furthered the need for instant convenience.3 However, this combination can be flawed; with an increased desire for companies to stay competitive and meet growing demand, a
gap in user safety becomes inevitable absent adequate regulations and protections.
The California Public Utilities Committee first coined the name “transportation-networking company” (“TNC”).4 A TNC is “an organization . . . that
provides prearranged transportation services for compensation using an onlineenabled application (app) or platform to connect passengers with drivers using
their personal vehicles.”5 Recognizing this new service—by hosting open discussions and developing regulations—the committee hoped to ensure public
safety while encouraging innovation and convenience.6
The recent popularity of sharing economies paired with simple and convenient smartphone applications made this service desirable to millennials.7 TNCs
connect customers with nearby drivers through a visual application that provides a price range to the desired destination, information on the driver and his

2

See generally Om Malik, The Long History of the Fight Against Uber, NEW YORKER (June
26, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-long-history-of-the-fight-against-ub
er [https://perma.cc/Q7R8-TH5J].
3
See generally MARKETLINE, UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC.: CALLING A CAB FOR THE TAXI
INDUSTRY? 8 (2014).
4
Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, Proposed Decision, Decision
Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants to
the Transportation Industry 2 (Sept. 19, 2013). The California Public Utilities Company was
assembled shortly after the first three TNCs officially launched in San Francisco in 2012. Id.
at 4.
5
Id. at 2.
6
Id. at 4.
7
See Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change 3 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2014). See generally
Ashley Stahl, A Millennial Manifesto: Why Gen Y Will Change the World, FORBES (Apr. 28,
2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleystahl/2016/04/28/a-millennial-manifes
to [https://perma.cc/4L7D-BS3B].
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or her vehicle, and the medium to pay.8 Additionally, drivers use their own vehicles, which is the first of many cost advantages over traditional transportation
models.9 Uber’s stated goal of creating accessible transportation in order to increase users’ opportunities to “connect” with their city10 is dramatically changing the transportation norm because Uber is cost effective and easy to use.
Two main technology-enabled transportation models currently exist: ridesharing and ridesourcing.11 TNCs provide the ridesourcing services previously
described. Ridesharing is essentially a carpool service with the assistance of a
smartphone application.12 In the 1980s and 1990s, ridesharing dramatically increased in popularity, and by 2004, technology-enabled ridesharing services
became available.13 Ridesharing uses a technology platform to group travelers
in a private vehicle, all with a similar destination, with the goal of saving travel
costs, reducing emissions, and improving traffic congestion.14 Ridesharing faces similar concerns as ridesourcing, including regulations, insurance, safety,
and lack of customer awareness.15 But in contrast, ridesourcing does not provide the same environmental benefits as ridesharing, as a driver’s motivation to
pick up riders is based on fare income.16 Thus, TNC drivers are incentivized to
make any trip available rather than providing incidental rides to pre-planned
locations.17 TNCs’ spontaneity and convenience quickly became more appealing and user friendly than ridesharing. In sum, TNCs appear to be more similar
to traditional taxi services with the ridesharing benefits of a smart phone application used to quickly arrange individualized rides, or even to carpool.18 While
ridesourcing companies remain in limbo in the debate of what type of service
8

See John G. Browning, Conning the IADC Newsletters: Emerging Technology and Its Impact on Automotive Litigation, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 83, 84 (2014); see also Lisa Rayle et al.,
App-Based, On-Demand Ride Services: Comparing Taxi and Ridesourcing Trips and User
Characteristics in San Francisco 2 (Univ. of Cal. Transp. Ctr., Working Paper No. UCTCFR-2014-08, 2014).
9
See Malik, supra note 2. This note will not focus on the cost-effective benefits of transportation-networking companies, but presumably this benefit adds to Uber’s overall appeal.
10
The Uber Story, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story [https://perma.cc/E68V-RV99]
(last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
11
See Rayle et al., supra note 8.
12
Id.
13
See SUSAN SHAHEEN, U.C. BERKELEY TRANSP. SUSTAINABILITY RES. CTR.,
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES AND RIDESOURCING: COMPARING TAXI AND
TNC/RIDESOURCING TRIPS AND USER CHARACTERISTICS IN SAN FRANCISCO (Nov. 4, 2014).
14
Rayle et al., supra note 8, at 2.
15
MOBILITY INV. PRIORITIES, REAL-TIME RIDESHARING, http://mobility.tamu.edu/mip/strateg
ies-pdfs/travel-options/technical-summary/real-time-ridesharing-4-pg.pdf [https://perma.cc/8
2P2-G9R7] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
16
Rayle et al., supra note 8.
17
Donald N. Anderson, “Not Just a Taxi”? For-Profit Ridesharing, Driver Strategies, and
VMT, 41 TRANS. 1099, 1100–01 (2014) (describing characteristics of TNC services).
18
See generally Rayle et al., supra note 8; Announcing UberPool, UBER NEWSROOM (Aug.
5, 2014), https://newsroom.uber.com/announcing-uberpool [https://perma.cc/W3V4-2R67].
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they provide and what type of regulations are required, users and TNCs continue to push for their service to be executed everywhere because the benefits are
extremely desirable to the current technologically-advanced generation.19
There are multiple TNCs in the market, but this note specifically focuses
on Uber—the world’s largest TNC.20 Uber incorporated in Delaware in 2010
and serves more than eight million users worldwide.21 Uber’s 160,000-plus
U.S. drivers22 pride themselves on being independent contractors for a technology company, not a transportation company.23 With a pre-money valuation of
$17 billion as of July 2014, Uber’s impressive growth is attributed to the application’s convenience and reliability.24 If Uber plans to continue providing thousands of people with flexible employment opportunities and convenient rides, it
must put customer safety at the top of its priority list.
II. UBER DRIVERS REJOICE! HOW NEVADA EVENTUALLY LEGALIZED
TRANSPORTATION-NETWORKING COMPANIES
A coy and mischievous smile emerges as you see the flashing lights, hear
the cliché sound of coins dropping into the metal slot machine tray, and feel the
warm desert air when a friend suggests a trip to Las Vegas. But once you arrive
in the city of neon lights, you are faced with a transportation nightmare. It may
begin with the large taxi line that greets your arrival at McCarran Airport, or
when you try to arrange a ride to a club on the strip that is just a little too far for
a woman in heels to reach on foot.
With all of Las Vegas’s perks, transportation is without a doubt one of its
pitfalls. When traveling to New York City, for example, you can choose between a taxi, bus, subway, or boat to get to your destination; but in Las Vegas,
a taxi is your only realistic option. Without a variety of public transportation
alternatives,25 locals and tourists alike craved the services provided by alternative-transportation companies. Likewise, TNCs found the idea of setting up
shop in Nevada highly desirable because it is one of the most lucrative trans-

19

See Rayle et al., supra note 8, at 1.
Scott Austin et al., The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club [https://perma.cc/BEN6-K4R5].
21
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., COMPLAINT, REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION, INJUNCTION, AND
OTHER RELIEF SUBMITTED BY THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 2–3 (2015).
22
Ellen Huet, Uber’s Ever-Renewing Workforce: One-Fourth of Its Current U.S. Drivers
Joined Last Month, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellen
huet/2015/01/22/uber-study-workforce [https://perma.cc/3AN3-C8PE].
23
See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
24
MARKETLINE, supra note 3, at 7, 9.
25
In addition to taxis, there are bus routes and a monorail available.
20
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portation markets, with over forty million annual visitors and more than $300
million in annual taxi company revenue.26
Since the violent taxicab wars in Southern Nevada in 1969,27 concern for
safe tourism and general public wellbeing has driven the discussion toward
stricter transportation regulations.28 However, the unfamiliarity and mystery of
Uber quickly revived those similar safety concerns. Amid much controversy,
Uber launched its application in Nevada on October 24, 2014.29 To placate the
taxicab and transportation authorities, Uber focused its service on residential
customers, avoiding the Las Vegas Strip and the airport.30 When Uber first
launched, it was not regulated, and the issue of public safety quickly became
apparent.31 Fewer than five days after Uber launched its application, the Nevada Transportation Authority (“NTA”) and the state Attorney General’s office
sought court orders from several district judges around the state to halt Uber’s
operations in Nevada.32 While some judges ordered the company to stop operating until a hearing could be scheduled, others found no immediate public
safety concerns.33 After forum-shopping accusations and multiple lawsuits
were filed, on November 25, 2014, Washoe County District Judge Scott Freeman issued a statewide injunction banning Uber for failing to follow state
transportation regulations.34
Throughout 2015, Uber, state regulators and legislators, the NTA, and
countless other affected parties worked together to achieve legalization in Nevada.35 While the journey came with many hurdles—namely the failure of Sen26

L.V. CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., 2015 LAS VEGAS YEAR-TO-DATE EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2015); see also NEV. TAXICAB AUTH., TAXICAB INDUSTRY STATISTICS:
SEPTEMBER 2015, at 7 (2015).
27
Richard N. Velotta, ‘Taxi Wars’ of ‘60s Predate Today’s Stand-off with Uber, L.V. REV.J. (Nov. 29, 2014, 8:57 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/traffic-transportation/taxiwars-60s-predate-today-s-stand-uber [https://perma.cc/KK4K-S7AK].
28
Provides for the Permitting and Regulation of Transportation Network Companies: Hearing on S.B. 439 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Labor & Energy, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess.
(Nev. 2015) (statement of Richard Bryan, Frias Transp. Mgmt. Co).
29
Richard N. Velotta, Uber Begins Ride-Sharing Service in Vegas, Reno, L.V. REV.-J. (Oct.
24, 2014, 6:19 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/uber-begins-ridesharing-service-vegas-reno [https://perma.cc/TNF6-ELSK].
30
See id.
31
Kimberly Pierceall, Judge Denies Order to Stop Uber in Nevada, CNSNEWS.COM (Oct. 29,
2014, 6:34 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/judge-denies-order-stop-uber-nevada [http
s://perma.cc/HA9A-6Q3M].
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Richard N. Velotta, Uber Temporarily Suspends Operations in Nevada, L.V. REV.-J.
(Nov. 27, 2014, 12:33 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada/uber-temporarilysuspends-operations-nevada [https://perma.cc/VV97-6G2H].
35
“We remain committed to working with Nevada’s leaders to create a permanent regulatory framework that affords Nevadans the flexibility and innovation offered by Uber,” stated
Uber spokeswoman, Eva Behrend, in response to the court’s ruling. Eric M. Johnson, Rides-
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ate Bill 439 in April36 and peaceful protests by members of taxi unions in
May37—TNCs finally crossed the finish line. On May 29, 2015, Governor Brian Sandoval signed Assembly Bills 175 and 176, which, inter alia, set up the
regulatory framework, imposed a 3 percent fare tax, and put TNCs under the
jurisdiction of the NTA.38 On September 11, 2015, fewer than three months later, the NTA adopted the final regulations and began to review TNC applications.39 Irrespective of some Nevada counties’ requirements of local business
licenses, Uber officially became active in Nevada on September 15, 2015.40
Uber’s limited time in Nevada since legalization has come with great successes and great struggles. By early 2016, Nevada had approximately 19,000
TNC drivers.41 In January 2016, the Reno-Tahoe Airport began to allow TNCs
to pick up customers42—a major victory for Uber, since airport transactions are
a major source of taxi revenue. However, some unfortunate incidents with
TNCs have occurred since they began operating legally in Nevada. For example, an individual identifying as an Uber driver solicited a plain-clothes police
officer after assuring this potential passenger that he did not need the Uber app
to pay the $20 ride fare.43 In mid-2016, a passenger who was not scheduled

haring Firm Uber Suspends Operations in Nevada, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2014, 7:07 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nevada-ridesharing-idUSKCN0JB18J20141127 [http
s://perma.cc/8H7R-43PK].
36
Sandra Chereb, Senate Rejects Bill to Allow Ride-Sharing in Nevada, L.V. REV.-J. (Apr.
15, 2015, 8:26 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada-legislature/senate-rejectsbill-allow-ride-sharing-nevada [https://perma.cc/CE2J-9DAS].
37
See Richard N. Velotta & Ricardo Torres, Taxi Drivers Stage Peaceful Protest Against
Uber on the Strip, L.V. REV.-J. (May 29, 2015, 10:13 PM), http://ww
w.reviewjournal.com/business/taxi-drivers-stage-peaceful-protest-against-uber-the-strip [http
s://perma.cc/J8FP-T89F].
38
See Taxi Drivers Protest, Governor Signs Ride-Sharing Bill, NEWS 3 L.V. (May 29, 2015),
http://news3lv.com/archive/taxi-drivers-protest-governor-signs-ride-sharing-bill [https://per
ma.cc/9EN7-GUN8]. The first five million dollars collected in each biennium of the three
percent tax will go to the Highway Fund, with the remainder going to the state’s general
fund. STATE OF NEV. GOVERNOR’S FIN. OFFICE, SILVER SAGE REVENUE REPORT AUG. 3, 2016,
at 1 (2016).
39
See Nevada Board Adopts Regulations for Ride-Hailing Companies, FOX 5 VEGAS (Nov.
20, 2015, 1:48 PM), http://www.fox5vegas.com/story/30011003/nevada-board-adoptsregulations-for-ride-hailing-companies [https://perma.cc/2PCS-3UDU].
40
See Richard N. Velotta & Ben Botkin, Uber, Lyft Up and Running, Defy Clark County,
L.V. REV.-J. (Sept. 15, 2015, 6:14 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/traffictransportation/uber-lyft-and-running-defy-clark-county [https://perma.cc/S8NS-KNPB].
41
Michelle Rindels, As Industry Shifts, Las Vegas Cabs Do Some Soul-Searching, L.V. SUN
(Feb. 11, 2016, 2:00 AM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2016/feb/11/as-industry-shifts-lasvegas-cabs-do-some-soul-sea [https://perma.cc/5DKV-EHLM].
42
See Olivia DeGennaro, Reno-Tahoe Airport Allows Uber Drivers to Pick People Up, Taxi
Drivers React, NEWS 4 (Jan. 20, 2016), http://mynews4.com/news/local/reno-tahoe-airportallows-uber-drivers-to-pick-people-up-taxi-drivers-react [https://perma.cc/8QLW-MZBD].
43
Richard N. Velotta, Transportation Regulators Investigate 2 Incidents Involving Uber
Drivers, L.V. REV.-J. (Oct. 4, 2015, 11:45 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/traffic-
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through the app to be picked up allegedly stabbed an Uber driver.44 In an effort
to combat any more hiccups in its history in Nevada, Uber’s website offers recommendations and regulations for drivers in Las Vegas, including guidelines
such as: “Do not pick up riders directly on the Strip. . . . Do not wait in taxi
lines. Do not stage on casino properties. Do not accept cash for rides. Do not
give fare quotes or estimates to riders.”45 While Uber users have not reported
dangerous incidents in Nevada like those experienced by other users around the
country, as of this note’s writing, the potential for an Uber horror story may be
just around the corner.
III. WITH GREAT LEGALIZATION COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY: SAFETY
CONCERNS FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS
Uber’s controversial and prolonged evolution in Nevada should have provided Nevada’s legislators and regulators ample time to proactively address the
countless safety concerns other states faced while legalizing and regulating
TNCs.46 However, the signed assembly bills 175 and 176, and accompanying
regulations fall short in safeguarding Nevada’s unique customer base, especially compared to Nevada’s pre-existing taxi regulations and other jurisdiction’s
TNC regulations.
When Uber first began operating in Nevada in late 2014,47 taxi drivers
urged TNCs to follow the already-established taxi regulations,48 because those
regulations were designed to protect the unique passengers and transportation
market in Nevada.49 Despite the taxi industry’s pleas for equal regulations, Nevada created lax regulations for TNCs, essentially disregarding the state’s vio-

transportation/transportation-regulators-investigate-2-incidents-involving-uber-drivers [http
s://perma.cc/DY4F-CDBR].
44
Parker Collins, Uber Driver Stabbed in Downtown Las Vegas, KTNV (Apr. 2, 2016,
10:38 AM), http://www.ktnv.com/news/uber-driver-stabbed-in-downtown-las-vegas [https:
//perma.cc/ZSE9-T225].
45
Local Regulations, UBER L.V., http://lasvegas.ubermovement.com/local-regulations
[https://perma.cc/SD8V-BTVY] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
46
See Richard N. Velotta, Taxi Exec Calls Proposed Uber, Lyft Rules a ‘Public Safety Disaster’, L.V. REV.-J. (Aug. 11, 2015, 2:36 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/traffictransportation/taxi-exec-calls-proposed-uber-lyft-rules-public-safety-disaster [https://perma.c
c/TY29-J4VC] (“It appears that Nevada is unable to learn from the misadventures of other
states with TNCs.”).
47
Velotta, supra note 29.
48
Velotta, supra note 27. See generally infra Part III.
49
Velotta, supra note 27 (“Taxi regulations are overseen by the Nevada Taxicab Authority,
which was established in 1969 after more than a decade of confrontations among cabdrivers
that casino executives feared were getting so violent that they would discourage tourists
from coming to Las Vegas.”).
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lent history with taxicabs, and the present-day news stories and litigation pushing for increased safety measures.50
A. Different Requirements for Essentially the Same Service
Nevada Assembly Bills 175 and 176 established the background-check requirements for TNC applicants.51 This section will discuss the backgroundcheck requirements for TNC drivers in Nevada in comparison to the requirements for taxi drivers—specifically, eligibility based on past criminal acts and
who bears the responsibility for the manner in which the background checks in
Nevada are conducted.
When a driver applies to become an Uber driver,52 the TNC conducts a
background check from commercially available criminal-history and sexoffender-registry databases53 and reviews the applicant’s driving record.54 A
driver must be at least nineteen years old, and possess a valid driver’s license
and a DMV-registered vehicle.55 An applicant cannot have been found guilty of
driving under the influence (“DUI”),56 nor can the applicant’s name appear on a
database with sex-offender-registry information, regardless of the time period.57
The applicant cannot be found guilty of terrorism, an act of violence, a sexual
offense, fraud, theft, damage to property, or a felony involving the use of a vehicle in the previous seven years.58 This section of the signed bills provides the
most opportune avenue for the legislature to implement strict standards to protect passengers from potentially dangerous drivers.
While the legislature appointed the NTA to further regulate TNCs, the
NTA failed to properly fill in the blanks. The cracks in the regulations are glaring when compared to the requirements of Nevada taxi drivers and to those of
TNCs in other states. Nevada taxi companies must follow strict requirements
50

Id.; see also infra Part III.B. See generally, e.g., Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2015 WL 314131 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2015); Manzo v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 13-C-2407, 2014 WL 3495401 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014); Yellow Grp. v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 12 C 7967, 2014 WL 3396055 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2014).
51
Assemb. B. 175, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. § 30 (Nev. 2015); Assemb. B. 176, 2015 Leg.,
78th Sess. § 29 (Nev. 2015).
52
Assembly Bills 175 and 176 provide requirements for the entire state, while counties
within in the state have the opportunity to make additional minimal requirements. Assemb.
B. 175 § 44(2); Assemb. B. 176 § 44(2).
53
See infra Part IV.A. for more discussion on the important distinction between commercially available databases versus state-run databases used for background checks.
54
See Assemb. B. 176 § 29. For excessive driving violations, Nevada has a three-year time
limit. Id. § 29(3)(f). However, this note focuses solely on the issues presented by criminal
background—and not driving record—violations.
55
Id. § 29(3)(a)–(c).
56
Id. § 29(3)(h).
57
Id. § 29(3)(j).
58
Id. § 29(3)(i).
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when vetting their drivers. An applicant is required to: (1) be a resident of the
state for the previous thirty days, (2) have a valid driver’s license, (3) provide a
physician’s certificate to verify the driver has met certain health requirements,59
(4) list all convictions and pending court cases, (5) take a test to measure ability
to read and speak English, (6) get fingerprinted, (7) document child support status, and (8) attend a Driver’s Awareness Program.60 Then, the Nevada Criminal
History Repository—a statute-established “filing cabinet” of Nevada criminal
history records61—runs the applicant’s fingerprints through an in-state, criminal-record check, which are then forwarded to the FBI for a more detailed review.62
Some of the regulations for taxi drivers, however, do seem more lax than
TNCs. For example, a taxi driver cannot have any DUI convictions within the
previous three years and cannot have been convicted of any felony within the
previous five years.63 However, taxi regulations provide a catch-all provision
eliminating applicants if the NTA finds a driver morally unfit or detrimental to
the public.64 “Morally unfit” or a danger to public safety65 may include being
responsible for an accident resulting in death of or injury to another, being a
habitually reckless or negligent driver, frequently violating traffic laws, committing an offense in another state that would have resulted in revocation of a
license in Nevada, or being convicted of any sexual or moral turpitude offense.66 Thus, allowing the NTA more discretion when screening drivers.
Throughout the long journey to TNC legalization, the opposition—mostly
taxi companies and taxi unions—disagreed with the significant differences between the two services’ background-check requirements.67 Generally, the NTA
did not oppose TNCs in Nevada, but it believed that taxis were regulated for a
reason and that TNCs should be subject to the same requirements—in-depth

59

The applicant must obtain a certificate from a licensed physician if found to meet the
health requirements established by Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation 49 C.F.R.
§ 391.41. NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8842 (2015). The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation
requires that thirteen health conditions be met, including no history of certain heart and respiratory diseases, no use of Schedule I narcotics, and no diagnosis of alcoholism. 49 C.F.R.
§ 391.41(b) (2015).
60
Driver Permit Requirements, NEV. TAXICAB AUTH., http://taxi.nv.gov/Driver_In
fo/Driver_Permit_Requirements [https://perma.cc/ES5Q-VSXS] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016);
see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8841 (2015).
61
Mission Statement and History, NEV. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY: GEN. SERVS. DIV.,
http://gsd.nv.gov/About/Mission [https://perma.cc/J7QK-TVSE] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
62
See id.
63
Driver Permit Requirements, supra note 60.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See Yellow Checker Star Transportation, Position Statement in Opposition to SB 439 and
SB 440, at 7 (Mar. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Position Statement].
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background checks, commercial insurance, vehicle-safety standards, and consistent, reasonable, and stable fares and rates.68
One major, and concerning, difference lies between the two sets of regulations—namely, the process Uber uses to decide which applicants it considers
safe drivers versus the NTA’s long established screening procedure for taxi
drivers. The first difference is who conducts the background check. Uber uses a
third-party company, Checkr, to conduct a commercial background check
based on a driver’s name, address, license number and state, and social security
number.69 This process is clearly less rigorous than the NTA’s additional requirement that the Nevada Criminal History Repository and the FBI run an applicant’s fingerprints.70 While a private company may use databases with similar records, the state’s repository and the FBI database are regulated and
provide more secure and accurate archives of a driver’s criminal history.71
The second issue is what driver’s information is used to conduct a background check. TNC’s commercial background check uses basic personal information to search third-party databases.72 This check can result in many errors ranging from name misspellings or use of aliases to out-of-date and
unverified information.73 Name-based background checks have a potential error
rate of 43 percent, compared to a roughly 1 percent potential error rate with
fingerprint background checks.74 Further, fingerprinting is one of the most important components of any background check regimen because fingerprints are
true identifiers and cannot be falsified.75 The FBI has been the national repository for fingerprints and criminal history since 1924; the accuracy, consistency,
and continuity of records are far superior to third-party commercial data
searches.76 TNCs and their supporters counter the effectiveness of fingerprints

68

Id. at 1.
CHECKR, https://checkr.com [https://perma.cc/RCM7-43NL] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016);
see Tracey Lien, Kalamazoo Shootings: Here’s How Uber Does Its Background Checks,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tnuber-background-check-20160222-story.html [https://perma.cc/4S6F-5ULE]. Uber previously used a company called Hirease to conduct its background checks. Complaint, at 8, Doe v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-04670, 2015 WL 5915994 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015) [hereinafter Doe Complaint].
70
Driver Permit Requirements, supra note 60.
71
MATTHEW W. DAUS & PASQUALINO “PAT” RUSSO, ONE STANDARD FOR ALL: CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR TAXICAB, FOR-HIRE, AND TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY
(TNC) DRIVERS 11 (2015); MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T L.
PROJECT, WANTED: ACCURATE FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (2013).
72
See Doe Complaint, supra note 69, at 8.
73
DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 10.
74
Id. at 86.
75
Id. at 11, 15.
76
Id. at 73–74.
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by focusing on the cost, potential inconveniences,77 and occasional imperfections in the system.78 Uber promotes the benefits of their three-step background-check process and their driver review function as a sufficient screening
mechanism.79 Ultimately, the numerous reliability benefits and the public confidence behind knowing their driver had a fingerprint background check far exceed any inconvenience to the potential driver or company.80
The third issue is which criminal records Uber accepts, particularly because
a decent percentage would not be acceptable to the NTA. TNC regulations allow convicted sexual offenders to drive for Uber, while taxi regulations explicitly forbid it. For an Uber applicant, there must be at minimum seven years
since the applicant’s sexual offense conviction before becoming a driver.81
There may not be much assurance in the review of an applicant’s name in a
sex-offender database as the background checks review the sex-offender registries maintained by each state.82 Some states restrict what names are allowed to
be posted on sex-offender registries information and	
   11 percent of sexoffender-registry information has been found to have critical errors,83 which is
likely increased when searches are conducted through unofficial commercial
databases. Further, according to Uber’s website, information regarding approximately 25 percent of registered sex offenders in California cannot be posted to
online registries, significantly reducing the reliability of Uber’s background
check process.84 Comparatively, the NTA may choose not to grant licenses to
drivers who have committed sexual crimes or moral turpitude offenses, regard77

See Curt Woodward, Uber CEO Says Fingerprint-Based Background Checks Can Be
‘Discriminatory’, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/12/
01/uber-ceo-says-fingerprint-based-background-checks-can-be-discriminatory [https://perm
a.cc/PL77-93S8].
78
Uber’s blog contains numerous convoluted reasons why their background check requirements are superior to fingerprinting. See Details on Safety, UBER NEWSROOM (May 12,
2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/details-on-safety [https://perma.cc/GMM8-7ZB2].
79
Id. According to Uber’s website, the review function is where “riders rate their experience
at the end of every trip, and drivers do the same. Uber regularly reviews that feedback and,
through this process, we’re able to create and maintain a safe and respectful environment for
riders and drivers.” Feedback Is a Two-Way Street, UBER NEWSROOM (Apr. 23, 2014),
https://newsroom.uber.com/feedback-is-a-2-way-street [https://perma.cc/HWJ2-YKAH].
80
DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 6, 74–75.
81
Assemb. B. 176, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. § 29(3)(i) (Nev. 2015).
82
Id § 29(2)(b)(2).
83
DOUGLAS R. HOFFER, STATE OF VT. OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR, SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRY: QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY WARRANTS ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS 2 (July 14,
2014); see also DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 11.
84
Details on Safety, supra note 78; Sex Offender Registration and Exclusion Information,
STATE CAL. DEP’T JUSTICE: OFFICE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/sex
reg.aspx?lang=ENGLISH [https://perma.cc/WGL4-QFXT] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016)
(“[A]pproximately 25% of registered sex offenders cannot be posted online by law. Whether
public disclosure is permitted is based on the type of sex crime for which the person is required to register.”).
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less of the time frame with the catch-all regulatory provision.85 Current TNC
regulations are concerning because sex-related crimes, or similar moral turpitude offenses, are crimes that an individual likely does not just commit once, as
compared to, for example, a battery.86 While all sex offenders may not
reoffend, the opportunity to have control over a passenger may put the driver in
the position to more likely reoffend than if employed in a less-intimate environment. The significant differences in the how strict the regulations for each
service are may be one reason for the increased amount of sexually related incidents involving Uber drivers than taxi drivers. The different standards for taxi
and Uber drivers are substantial and must be addressed, especially when both
are giving rides to the vulnerable population in Nevada, including travelers
from all over the world, intoxicated individuals, both tourists and locals. Since
the two services do not greatly differ in their main function, the regulations
should not be so inconsistent.
Moreover, major cities like New York City and Houston already require
fingerprint background checks for Uber drivers.87 The requirements for drivers
in New York City and in Nevada are frighteningly different, even though their
consumers are similar, vulnerable tourists. In New York City, a driver must
complete a physical examination by a licensed doctor, obtain an upgraded Class
E license, take a defensive driver’s course, take sex-trafficking-awareness training, pass a drug test, and submit to fingerprinting.88 Houston requires its TNC
drivers to undergo a five-panel drug test, physical examination, warrant check,
and fingerprinting with the Texas Department of Public Safety.89 Cities in Cali85

Driver Permit Requirements, supra note 60.
Presence of the following factors may increase an individual’s tendency to commit a sexual assault: “physiological/biological (e.g., imbalanced hormones, being sexually attracted to
children); sociocultural (e.g., being exposed to broader social messages supportive of aggression); developmental/environmental (e.g., having witnessed domestic violence); and situational/circumstantial (e.g., having easy access to victims, extreme levels of stress).” CTR. FOR
SEX OFFENDER MGMT., FACT SHEET: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS 3
(2008); see, e.g., Karen Kersting, New Hope for Sex Offender Treatment, 34 MONITOR
PSYCHOL. 52 (2003) (“People commit sexual crimes for different reasons . . . . Some are
highly predatory, highly psychopathic and have repeated offenses, making them more likely
to reoffend.”). Further, in California, there is even a state institution specifically for sexual
offenders who have completed their sentence, but are still deemed dangerous to the community. Department of State Hospitals – Coalinga, CA. DEP’T. STATE HOSPS.,
http://www.dsh.ca.gov/coalinga [https://perma.cc/98ME-XQBJ] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016)
(“The fundamental goal of the DSH-Coalinga Sex Offenders Treatment Program is for the
individual to acquire pro-social skills and to prevent recurrence of sexual offending.”).
87
Douglas Hanks, Uber Faces Fingerprinting Fight in Miami-Dade, MIAMI HERALD (Feb.
25, 2016, 6:44 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article62532202.html [https://perma.cc/W8MV-NR62].
88
N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, DRIVER NEW APPLICATION AND CHECKLIST
REQUIREMENTS (PART B) (2016); TLC License Checklist, UBER N.Y.C., http://driveuber
nyc.com/tlc-license-checklist [https://perma.cc/FX4S-MZ7R] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
89
Letter from Christopher Newport, Mayor’s Chief of Staff, Houston, Texas, to Honorable
Ann Kitchen, Council Member, Austin, Texas (Oct. 15, 2015) (on file with the author).
86
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fornia and Massachusetts, Austin, Chicago, and Atlanta are all currently debating fingerprinting for Uber background checks, several of which are supportive
of the requirement.90
B. What Have Uber Drivers Done?
The troubling experiences suffered by Uber passengers at the hands of
drivers around the world demonstrate the urgency and necessity for increased
safety protections. For example, in 2014, a Chicago Uber driver faced allegations he sexually assaulted a female passenger.91 A Los Angeles driver was accused of kidnapping a young woman from a club and taking her to a hotel to
sexually assault her.92 In Boston, a driver allegedly drove a young woman to a
secluded area, locked her in the vehicle, then choked and raped her in the
backseat.93 In San Francisco, an Uber driver allegedly attempted to kick angry
passengers out of his car by hitting one of the passengers with a hammer, after
they chastised the driver’s choice of routes.94 In Washington, D.C., an Uber
driver ran a red light, deviated from the planned route, and took the passengers
on a high-speed joyride to evade a lighted taxi inspector.95 In 2015, a Los Angeles driver reportedly yelled at a female passenger before violently grabbing
her arm and throwing her out of his vehicle.96 In Denver, an Uber driver alleg-

90

Airport Aims to Use Uber Drivers’ Fingerprints to Check Past, FOX NEWS (Mar. 28,
2016), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/03/28/airport-aims-to-use-uber-drivers-fingerprints
-to-check-past.html [https://perma.cc/QMH3-YSC6]; Jim Dallke, Uber and Lyft Won’t Face
Fingerprinting in Chicago—at Least for Now—Under New Regulations, CHI. INNO (June 22,
2016, 1:50 PM), http://chicagoinno.streetwise.co/2016/06/22/uber-and-lyft-wont-facefingerprinting-in-chicago-at-least-for-now-under-new-regulations [https://perma.cc/5Q3B-2
W4L].
91
Uber Driver in Chicago Accused of Sexual Assault, CBS NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014, 11:49
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/chicago-police-investigate-uber-driver-accused-of-rape
[https://perma.cc/J34M-DWAT].
92
Veronica Rocha, Uber Driver Accused of Kidnapping Clubgoer, Taking Her to Motel,
L.A. TIMES (June 3, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-uberdriver-kidnapping-hotel-20140603-story.html [https://perma.cc/AAY7-VH4E].
93
Dara Kerr, Who’s Really Taking You for an Uber Ride?, CNET (Dec. 22, 2014, 5:00
AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/whos-really-taking-you-for-an-uber-ride [https://perma.cc/
N22L-HCVB].
94
Dara Kerr, How Risky is Your Uber Ride? Maybe More than You Think, CNET (Oct. 8,
2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/how-risky-is-your-uber-ride-maybe-more-thanyou-think [https://perma.cc/TU7Q-VQG4].
95
Julie Zauzmer & Lori Aratani, Man Visiting D.C. Says Uber Driver Took Him on Wild
Ride, WASH. POST (July 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/drgridlock/wp/2014/07/09/man-visiting-d-c-says-uber-driver-took-him-on-wild-ride [https://pe
rma.cc/C8U9-JAH8].
96
Carman Tse, Woman Says Uber Driver Called Her a ‘F*cking B*tch’ and Threw Her onto the Street, LAIST (June 4, 2015, 4:38 PM), http://laist.com/2015/06/04
/uber_driver_behaving_badly.php [https://perma.cc/4MEV-M3CE].
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edly drove a passenger to the airport and then returned to rob her house.97 In
New Jersey, a young Uber driver was charged with four counts of sexual assault after being invited back to the victim’s house with some of her friends.98
All too many similar incidents plague Uber’s reputation, and dangerous incidents continue to occur regularly.99
In August 2015, the San Francisco District Attorney filed a complaint alleging twenty-five drivers with serious criminal records including murder, child
abuse, and assault, passed Uber’s background checks and were cleared to
drive.100 Two months later, a lawsuit filed in Northern California alleged that
Uber failed to protect two female riders against sexual assault, stating that Uber’s marketing campaigns focused more on maximizing profits than on protecting female passengers.101 Most of the news reports, lawsuits, and public outcry
blame insufficient background checks for these safety lapses. Since preemployment background checks are designed to screen out employees that may
cause a company potential issues later, the accuracy and type of background
checks are vital.102 Of course, some taxi users may experience dangerous situations and issues with their drivers, but strict safety regulations and rigorous
background checks help limit the frequency of those occurrences.103 While
states differ in their background-check requirements, Nevada, with its economy
based largely in tourism and entertainment,104 must make safety a greater concern than what is currently in place.105
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Tara Fowler, Uber Driver Allegedly Drove Woman to Airport, Then Went Back to Rob
Her Home, PEOPLE (Apr. 1, 2015, 9:45 AM), http://www.people.com/article/uber-driverarrested-attempted-burglary [https://perma.cc/L4GX-DFA9].
98
Jessica Remo, Driver Accused of Raping Customer Worked for Uber, NJ.COM (Aug. 28,
2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.nj.com/union/index/ssf/2015/08/driver_accused_of_rap
ing_customer_worked_for_uber.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter [http://
perma.cc/4FWJ-RNKC].
99
See generally Reported List of Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft, WHO’S DRIVING YOU?,
http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents [https://perma.cc/RRX6-KTY2] (last
visited Nov. 5, 2016).
100
See Complaint, at 11–13, State v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-543120, 2014 WL
6911066 (Cal. Super. Dec. 9, 2014); Matt Weinberger, Uber Hired a Convicted Murderer
Who Applied with a Fake Name, Complaint Claims, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 19, 2015, 7:45 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-background-check-civil-suit-2015-8 [https://perma.cc/
D8JJ-W8MA].
101
Doe Complaint, supra note 69, at 2.
102
DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 8.
103
See generally Adrienne LaFrance & Rose Eveleth, Are Taxis Safer than Uber?,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/are-taxissafer-than-uber/386207 [https://perma.cc/6QTE-GSMQ].
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See generally Doresa Banning, A Boon to Nevada’s Economy: Tourism Growth, NEV.
BUS. (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.nevadabusiness.com/2016/02/a-boon-to-nevadas-economytourism-growth [https://perma.cc/85UY-ELE9].
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See Position Statement, supra note 67, at 1–7.
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These incidents around the United States have prompted Uber’s development of different strategies in an attempt to address the issue of safety, but the
company’s ideas, albeit creative, do not fix the root of the problem.106 For example, Uber created a safety advisory board, consisting of police chiefs, attorney generals, professors, et cetera, to “provide critical recommendations and
counsel . . . to develop new methods and technologies that reduce risk and increase safety for riders, drivers, and the public.”107 Further, Uber now monitors
its drivers’ acceleration speed through the driver’s smart phone in an effort to
flag dangerous driving.108 While these efforts may help long-term goals for safer rides, it does not prevent problems; rather it provides information after the
fact that requires some type of subsequent enforcement or punishment to have
any effect.
When you book a ride through Uber, you should be able to expect a safe
journey to your destination. But with recent horror stories, this presumption
may no longer be reliable. While Uber conducts cursory background checks109
from the driver’s basic personal information, do these procedures sufficiently
ensure passenger safety?
IV. NEVADA’S UNIQUE POPULATION DESERVES SAFE RIDES FROM SAFE
DRIVERS
Nevada’s unique market and customer base call for more intense safeguards than are currently required. The state’s all-night lifestyle encourages
many vulnerable passengers to use Uber’s convenient service. The allure of using a mobile application to find a ride home, along with the non-cash payment
method, makes Uber an ideal choice for both tourists and locals who have taken
full advantage of the Vegas nightlife. Uber’s marketing seems to target this
crowd, while insufficiently protecting them. The campaign, “drink up, and Uber on,”110 encouraged susceptible passengers to enjoy a ride service from drivers who are arguably as risky as driving while intoxicated. Uber recently partnered with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (“MADD”) and conducted a study
on Uber’s effect on DUI incidents.111 The study found a 10 percent decrease in
106

For example, drivers are now placing “Bop It” toys in their backseats to help keep intoxicated passengers preoccupied during the drive. Danny Yadron & Nellie Bowles, Uber Monitoring Drivers in US in Attempt to Flag Dangerous Driving, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/26/uber-monitoring-drivers-us-passengersafety-houston [https://perma.cc/TRB7-B7J3].
107
Joe Sullivan, Announcing Uber’s U.S. Safety Advisory Board, UBER NEWSROOM (Nov.
24, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/safetyadvisoryboard [https://perma.cc/5CHE-UGUD].
108
See Yadron & Bowles, supra note 106.
109
See discussion supra Part III.A.
110
Doe Complaint, supra note 69, at 2.
111
See Making Our Roads Safer—For Everyone, UBER NEWSROOM (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://newsroom.uber.com/making-our-roads-safer-for-everyone-2 [https://perma.cc/BM6LRA3Q].
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DUI arrests since Uber entered Seattle in 2014.112 Uber’s “peak hours” were
found to be at the same time as most DUI crashes and arrests, and 93 percent of
respondents to a survey—after hearing the study’s finding on Uber’s impact on
decreasing DUI’s—said they would recommend Uber to their friends if they
had been drinking.113 Uber encourages intoxicated people to avoid the dangers
of drinking and driving by promising a safe ride—by under-screened drivers.
To better protect Nevadans and tourists, and to support the decrease in
drunk driving incidents, Nevada should require video recording in each TNC
vehicle, fingerprint background checks, and an in-application emergency button, allowing passengers not only to feel safe, but also be more safe. Much of
this note’s suggestions stem from the public’s reaction after an Uber driver in
India allegedly raped his passenger.114 India is Uber’s second-largest market
after the United States, and this incident had a detrimental effect on Uber’s
popularity in the country.115 Protests sparked India’s ban on the service in the
capital of New Delhi when the young female victim filed suit against the company.116 This devastating incident was the catalyst for Uber’s introduction of
new safety features in India, including the in-application emergency button.117
However, the momentum to implement in-car video recording, conduct stricter
background checks, and create safety alert buttons has slowed, as the majority
of Uber’s users are still lacking protection.
A. Uber Driver Background Checks Should Require Fingerprinting
In Nevada, taxi drivers are required to pay for and to comply with fingerprinting through the Nevada Repository; the fingerprints are subsequently
transferred to the FBI for a full review of the driver’s criminal history.118 Uber
routinely argues that fingerprint background checks are not worth the time and
money, stating the process has faults.119 However, Nevada’s unique riders deserve a higher level of protection, which could be accomplished through requirements similar to those implemented in taxis after the 1969 taxicab riots.120
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UBER & MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING (MADD), MORE OPTIONS. SHIFTING
MINDSETS. DRIVING BETTER CHOICES. 3 (2015).
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See id. at 4–10.
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Dan Levine, Delhi Uber Passenger Who Alleges Driver Rape Sues in U.S., REUTERS
(Jan. 29, 2015, 5:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/29/us-india-uber-lawsuitidUSKBN0L22NP20150129 [https://perma.cc/SVQ7-NLKH].
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Driver Permit Requirements, supra note 60.
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Kate McGee, After Sexual Assault Reports, Uber, Lyft May Face Expanded Background
Checks, KUT.ORG (Dec. 14, 2015), http://kut.org/post/after-sexual-assault-reports-uber-lyftmay-face-expanded-background-checks [https://perma.cc/779T-24HG].
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Velotta, supra note 27.
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Background checks vary in intensity depending on the purpose of the review, from a simple criminal history search to drug testing and full criminal,
civil, and economic review.121 Several organizations and companies provide
background check services; taxis utilize state-run repositories, while Uber uses
third-party commercial companies.122 However, the National Association of
Professional Background Screeners urges that “[i]nformation provided by
commercial databases should not be used as the sole source of information because of potential gaps in data, and the less than timely updates in some jurisdictions.”123 Therefore, TNC drivers in Nevada should be screened more thoroughly to protect the vulnerable and unique users, and to be held at the same or
similar standard as taxi drivers.
Fingerprinting is the most important element of a background check because it is the only identifier that cannot be falsified or stolen, and with increased technology, a national database will constantly grow and become more
accurate.124 “The FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS) is the largest biometric database of criminals in the world. Clear, legible fingerprints form the foundation of the Fingerprint Master File, which continues to grow by approximately 13,000 records each day.”125 Fingerprinting is
an easy process for applicants. All that is required is a small fee and a short visit to an approved fingerprint location, where an applicant’s fingerprints are collected electronically using live scanning machines.126
Further, fingerprinting is more secure because fingerprints are made up of
different patterns, ridge structures, and other characteristics, which are unique
to each individual.127 A fingerprint submission through IAFIS is processed in
one hour and twelve minutes.128 The FBI’s website encourages the use of fingerprinting for background checks because it provides positive identification
and eliminates falsities found with name-only searches.129 Uber, however, routinely rejects the importance of fingerprint background checks because they are
121

NAT’L ASS’N OF PROF’L BACKGROUND SCREENERS, supra note 1, at 2.
According to Uber’s website, California Uber applicants are reviewed through Checkr.
See Details on Safety, supra note 78.
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125
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DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 12.
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122

Fall 2016]

NEED A RIDE?

257

logistically difficult and do not always include a court’s final ruling if a charge
is dismissed or altered, thereby discriminating against some applicants.130 But
the solution does not have to be black and white—namely fingerprint versus
commercial checks. For example, if an applicant is flagged as having a criminal
record after a fingerprint background check, a review process or commercial
background check can be subsequently conducted. No matter how many
searches or databases Uber claims to review in its commercial background
checks, if Uber is not using biometrics, its applicant-review process will never
be sufficiently accurate, nor equivalent to taxi-driver requirements.131
As explained in a letter from Houston’s mayor’s office to a few city council members, a recent TNC driver, who passed the Hirease background check,
was found to have twenty-four aliases, five listed birthdays, ten listed social security numbers, and an active warrant for arrest, all through a City of Houston
fingerprint background check.132 Congressional representatives pushed Uber
and similar TNCs to increase their background-check requirements because of
the recent and horrific sexual assaults committed by their drivers.133 “By using
comprehensive fingerprint-based background checks, . . . companies can each
do their part to reduce the likelihood of similar crimes from occurring in the future.”134 District attorneys also have asked their legislatures to require fingerprint background checks when creating regulations for TNCs.135 National organizations have publicly pleaded for Uber to better protect women and other
vulnerable populations from potentially dangerous drivers who have not been
effectively screened.136

130

See Woodward, supra note 77.
As stated by Emily LeBlanc, Director of Safe Place, “[s]ometimes that means going
above and beyond what is required of us by law to do the right thing because it’s the right
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B. Video Recording in Vehicles Can Protect Both Drivers and Passengers
The smaller cameras can be made, the more dialogue there is about implementing video recording for various safety purposes. For example, legislators
around the country are pushing for mandatory body cameras on all lawenforcement officers because the cameras deter crime, keep officers and the
public accountable, and can provide hard evidence for investigations.137 The
successful implementation of body cameras and dash cameras for police officers and cameras in taxis suggests the potential for similar success if cameras are
required in TNCs. In the United States, large, crime-prone cities like Chicago,
New York, Seattle, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco require cameras in taxis.138 In the mid-2000s, the NTA rejected a proposed regulation requiring the NTA to implement cameras in taxis, and instead ordered “a one137

See generally David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as
Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357,
362 (2010).
138
See Daarel Burnette II, In Chicago Cabs, More Cameras Will Be Along for Ride, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 22, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-04-22/news/ct-met-cabcameras-20100422_1_cab-owners-bullet-resistant-partitions-cameras
[https://perma.cc/A8JE-ZY58]. In Chicago,
[t]he tiny camera sits above the rear-view mirror and takes a panoramic picture of the cab when
someone enters, or when the fare meter is turned on, and as they leave. Cabs must have signs informing passengers they will be photographed. Drivers who feel threatened can push a panic
button to get more pictures of the passengers.

Id.; see also Stephanie Chuang, Bay Area Taxi Cabs Add to Growing Trend of Using Dashcams, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 17, 2015, 11:43 PM), http://www.nbcbayar
ea.com/news/local/Bay-Area-Taxi-Cabs-Add-to-Growing-Trend-of-Using-Dashcams-29214
6711.html [https://perma.cc/XZB5-PX2C]; Paul Nussbaum, Temporary OK for Ride-Share
Firms in Pittsburgh; Cameras for Philly Cabs, PHILLY.COM (July 26, 2014), http://www.phil
ly.com/philly/business/transportation/20140725_Temporary_OK_for_Uber__Lyft__cameras
_for_Philly_cabs.html [https://perma.cc/KUD4-GMTF]. Additionally, some countries like
Australia, Canada, and Sweden have required cameras in taxis for several years to protect
their passengers. See, e.g., Safety Cameras in Taxis, TAXI SERVS. COMM’N,
http://taxi.vic.gov.au/drivers/taxi-drivers/driver-safety/safety-cameras-in-taxis [https://perm
a.cc/H4DA-HZFX] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016) (implementing safety cameras into taxicabs
by the State Government of Victoria, Australia began in 2001, finding that “[t]he cameras
deter violence and assist Victoria Police in identifying and catching those responsible for
attacks against drivers[]”); Ho Shan et al., Beijing’s Spy in the Cab, RADIO FREE ASIA (Aug.
1, 2008), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/taxi-08012008065129.html [https://perma.c
c/R49K-QPNP] (discussing the implementation of video cameras and satellite technology
that transmits live audio feed from Beijing taxicabs “for monitoring and linguistic analysis”);
Taxi Cameras in British Colombia, PASSENGER TRANSP. BD., http://www.ptboard.bc.ca/
cameras.htm [https://perma.cc/8MKD-V8Z3] (explaining the use of taxi cameras throughout
British Colombia and various other provinces in Canada, because “[t]axi cameras deter
crime and help police identify suspects and prosecute offenders”) (last visited Nov. 5, 2016);
Taxi Cameras Prevent Robbery, POINTGUARD, http://www.pointguard.se/latest-news/taxicameras-prevent-robbery [https://perma.cc/WVT8-VBN8] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016) (finding Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention statistics demonstrate the use of taxi
cameras in Sweden has been an “important contributing factor” in the decrease of assault and
robberies on taxi drivers).
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year test run to study the effectiveness of cameras deterring crime.”139 Several
groups, like the ACLU, opposed the regulations because of the potential Fourth
Amendment violations with the implementation of such cameras;140 even so,
most Nevada taxis are now equipped with cameras.141
While this note focuses on the risks that passengers face, it is important to
note that cameras also protect drivers. Consistently throughout the 1980s,
1990s, and 2000s, the national average of passenger-inflicted murders of taxicab drivers was thirty-eight per year.142 The factors that create such a high-risk
environment for taxi drivers are the same as those TNC drivers face because
both types of drivers work with the public, alone, often at night, and in some
high-crime areas.143 Although, one of the major environmental differences between the two is that taxis still mostly utilize cash transactions, which is likely
a promoter of passenger-inflicted crime. Taxi industries have tried to combat
these dangerous conditions with different safety measures like shields, cameras,
and driver panic buttons.144 However, some of these safety measures may not
translate smoothly to TNCs. For example, shields are unrealistic to place in
personally owned vehicles,145 and though shields are a deterrent of assaults in
taxis, the goal of shields in taxis is primarily to protect against robbery and
robbery-related assaults; this is not a significant danger with TNCs, given that
drivers do not accept cash.146

139

Taxicab Authority Rejects Plan for Cameras in Cabs, L.V. SUN (Feb. 25, 2004, 8:33
AM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2004/feb/25/taxicab-authority-rejects-plan-for-camerasin-cabs/ [http://lasvegassun.com/news/2004/feb/25/taxicab-authority-rejects-plan-for-camer
as-in-cabs/]; see Proposed Regulation of the Taxicab Authority, LCB File No. R114-03
(Aug. 25, 2003). With about 60 percent of taxicabs having camera systems installed, the
NTA tried again in 2005 to create regulations to require cameras in all taxicabs. Taxicab Authority Starts Over on Rules for Cameras in Cabs, L.V. SUN (July 12, 2005, 9:33 AM),
http://lasvegassun.com/news/2005/jul/12/taxicab-authority-starts-over-on-rules-for-cameras/
[https://perma.cc/9TH6-33ZE].
140
See Letter from Christine M. Guerci-Nyhus, Senior Deputy Att’y Gen., State of Nev., to
Yvette G. Moore, Adm’r, Nev. Taxicab Auth. 1 (Oct. 5, 2005) (on file with the author).
141
Id. at 2; Velotta, supra note 46.
142
Letter on Proposed Regulation 126-8 from Brett A. Berman, on behalf of Freedom Taxi
et al., to Dennis Weldon, Gen. Counsel, Phila. Parking Auth. 6 (Apr. 7, 2014) (on file with
the author).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 7.
145
It would be difficult to require shields in Uber vehicles because Uber drivers are currently not employees but independent contractors, thus Uber has less control over their vehicles.
Further, it would be difficult to maintain large shields in almost every type of car, as taxi vehicles are mainly only a few models. Uber drivers likely would also not like the inflexibility
of a shield in their personal vehicles as many drivers are part-time and pick up passengers on
their way to work, or when it is convenient.
146
See Letter on Proposed Regulation 126-8, supra note 142, at 6; see also Cammie K.C.
Menéndez et al., Effectiveness of Taxicab Security Equipment in Reducing Driver Homicide
Rates, 45 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED., no. 1, 2013, at 6.
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However, the benefits of camera use in taxis would be replicated if they
were required in all TNC vehicles. There are many cameras available, like
dashboard replacement rearview-mirror cameras,147 wide angle lens Go-Pros,148
and even drivers’ cellphone cameras. Because most drivers would be unwilling
to purchase a separate camera, and the required maintenance and external enforcement may be easily neglected, a driver’s cellphone camera is likely the
best option. Drivers already use their phones to pick up drivers and navigate
rides; therefore, the extra feature of video recording would be more convenient.
Additionally, because Nevada’s distracted driving statutes discourage drivers
from using their cellphones while driving,149 most drivers already have a cellphone stand located near the center console.150 This placement may be an ideal
means to record as much of a car’s interior as possible while remaining plugged
into a charging source in the vehicle. Further, this placement would make the
phone visible to riders, alerting them of the video surveillance—along with
some kind of posted warning of the video recording—which has been shown to
be the most effective method of reducing crime in taxicabs.151
The safety features suggested here are not designed to solve all of the problems that may arise. Rather, this note intends to encourage increased safety
measures, while still shedding light on the difficulties that may impede the implementation of the suggested safety measures. Requiring cameras in Uber vehicles invites discussion of both constitutional and logistical152 issues.
147

See e.g., Falcon Zero F360 HD DVR Dual Dash Cam, Rear View Mirror, 1080p, 32GB
SD Card, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00E56WY18/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UT
F8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B00E56WY18&linkCode=as2&tag=you
086-20&linkId=BNTTO43TMR4UJFZD [https://perma.cc/429A-CFB9] (last visited Nov. 6,
2016).
148
See e.g., GoPro HERO3+: Silver Edition, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/
B00F3F0EIU/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B00F3
F0EIU&linkCode=as2&tag=you086-20&linkId=4ZN6DQ5KY7VRSDD5
[https://perma.cc/FCK8-AB6N] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
149
NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165 (2015) (“Using handheld wireless communications device
to type or enter text, send or read data, engage in nonvoice communication or engage in
voice communications without use of hands-free device unlawful; exceptions; penalty; additional penalty for violation in work zone or pedestrian safety zone.”).
150
See Dom Esposito, Like Opening an Apple Product: Here’s What Uber Sends New Drivers (Video), 9TO5MAC (Aug. 18, 2014), http://9to5mac.com/2014/08/18/like-opening-anapple-product-heres-what-uber-sends-new-drivers-video [https://perma.cc/UUE6-FKLM].
151
Menéndez et al., supra note 146, at 5.
152
The main logistical problem with implementing wide-view cameras in taxis was the
shield’s placement because it greatly reduced the interior view. See Letter on Proposed Regulation 126-8, supra note 142, at 7. Additionally, in 2005, spot checks in cities with cameras
found that many cameras were non-functional and most had technical difficulties. Id. at 8;
see also Menéndez et al., supra note 146, at 5. However, these problems are not likely to occur if cameras are required in TNCs because there is no shield, and updated technology since
attempts to implement cameras in taxis lessens the likelihood of technical problems.
The next major problem is the price. As discussed above, the most effective camera
would be the driver’s phone. It would be a significantly less expensive and more reliable op-
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1. Constitutional problems with cameras in Uber cars
The constitutional issues found throughout taxi-camera implementation
debates will inevitably be raised if TNCs are required to have video recording.153 However, the differences between taxis and TNCs, and the distinctions
in the purposes behind using cameras, may alter the framework of the discussion. There are two avenues for cameras to be introduced in Uber vehicles: (1)
through a mandate from Uber, or (2) through state legislation or regulation. If
Uber mandates its drivers to use video recording, a passenger’s privacy rights
under the Fourth Amendment are not implicated, eliminating any constitutional
tion. However, the price of data is the main financial concern with requiring driver’s to use
their personal phones. Passing on the cost to the customers through a fare increase may be
the best option. Otherwise, there is the looming issue of whether Uber or the state has custody of the footage if one pays for the data. For example, if the state lowers the mandatory tax
on Uber to counter the increased data costs, in combination with the state’s action of requiring cameras, it the state would likely have control of the footage. While not having control of
the footage may benefit Uber in the employee v. independent contractor debate, it is doubtful
that the company would not agree to this arrangement. On the other hand, for example, if
Uber contracted a deal with a network company to supply the necessary data, then Uber
would have some control of the footage. The state may disapprove of this in fear of Uber not
cooperating in releasing footage or a similar legal battle like Uber is currently facing in California for failing to turn over detailed trip records. See Laura J. Nelson et al., Uber Should be
Suspended in California and Fined $7.3 Million, Judge Says, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2015,
5:59 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-suspended-20150715-story.html
[https://perma.cc/Z4V2-L8QK]. While there may be many alternatives to combat the price of
cameras, this is a major concern that could halt the implementation of cameras in Uber vehicles.
The third logistical problem is who has access to the footage. Similar to the debate surrounding requiring police officers to have body cameras, access to the footage must be protected. First, the footage should not be able to be saved on the driver’s phone to avoid the
possibility of a driver deleting footage. Second, it must be determined whether the footage
would be sent and stored at a government agency like the NTA or local law enforcement, or
at an Uber office. Third, as addressed above, the custody of the footage must be decided upfront to avoid potential legal issues after implementation. The fourth issue is in what situation could footage be released. This could be defined in the current Nevada regulations that
already require drivers to turnover of trip records, for example if the footage is under Uber’s
discretion, then proper legal requests for footage will need to be outlined. Fifth, the amount
of time footage would be stored for is an important consideration. This may depend on many
factors, including who has custody of the footage, the average surveillance video life in other
contexts like police body and taxicab cameras, and the situations where actual video recording in an Uber is allowed. These concerns may seem daunting but should be preemptively
decided to avoid inevitable issues in the future.
Further, there may be enforcement issues in implementing cameras in vehicles because
drivers may disable the camera feature, place their phone in a position where the video
would not sufficiently record the vehicle’s cabin, or attempt to block the camera. Additionally, problems may arise if the cameras malfunction, and the logistical and price concerns of
guaranteeing functional cameras. While there are many logistical concerns for implementing
cameras in Uber vehicles, the long-term benefits likely outweigh these hurdles.
153
See generally Letter from Christine M. Guerci-Nyhus to Yvette G. Moore, supra note
140, at 1.
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issues.154 If the state requires video recording by, for example, the NTA introducing regulations that require it, Uber would be bound by the regulation to
remain operating in Nevada. But when a government action directs a result, like
requiring cameras, Uber actually implementing the cameras is considered a
government action, and constitutional protections are triggered.155 The Fourth
Amendment protects individual privacy against certain government intrusions;
therefore, requiring video recording in an Uber, initiated by the government,
may be subject to Fourth Amendment protection.156
In a Fourth Amendment analysis, courts balance the extent of the surveillance against a passenger’s legitimate expectation of privacy.157 To invoke
Fourth Amendment protections, and for the latter element of the balancing test,
an individual must show that he or she had a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy.158 To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy, an individual must demonstrate a personal expectation that his activities would be private,
and he must show that his expectation was one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—that is, satisfying both a subjective and an objective
test.159 Courts have held that a passenger in a taxi has a reasonable expectation
of privacy because the taxi temporarily becomes a private place.160 The passenger has a significant degree of control over the taxi’s services because the passenger pays a fare, decides the destination, and can exclude others from the
ride.161 The Courts’ holdings in taxi privacy cases emphasized the passenger’s
154

Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 183 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating workplace
video surveillance is not within personal privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment). However, Uber’s other legal battles may deter the company from requiring cameras. For example,
Uber is currently facing lawsuits regarding the issue of whether drivers are independent contractors or employees. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D.
Cal. 2015). Uber is fighting to keep drivers as independent contractors and requiring drivers
to use video recording would likely counter Uber’s position as it would be increased control
on its drivers. See id. at 1137 (“Uber contends it exercises minimal control over how its
transportation providers actually provide transportation services to Uber customers, an important factor in determining whether drivers are independent contractors.”); see also Tess
Townsend, Why Uber Doesn’t Want to Fingerprint Drivers, INC. (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.inc.com/tess-townsend/uber-rethink-backgrounds.html [https://perma.cc/QSK65PGJ] (“If the company does adopt more rigorous background checks, which could include
fingerprinting, drivers seeking classification as employees could try to use the move as evidence they are indeed employees and not private contractors.”).
155
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
156
See United States v. Corona-Chavez, 328 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2003).
157
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 2002).
158
United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2000).
159
Id.; Young v. State, 849 P.2d 336, 340 (Nev. 1993).
160
See, e.g., Chapa v. State, 729 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (holding a passenger in a taxi had a reasonable expectation of privacy because the passenger exercised a significant degree of control over the taxicab).
161
NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8846 (2015) (stating taxicab drivers cannot take a passenger to a
destination other than the one requested by the passenger); NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8849(1)(e)
(2015) (stating a taxicab driver cannot allow another person in the taxi unless the original
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control over the taxicab, demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy,
which is the same control held by an Uber passenger. The TNC customer pays
a fare and determines the location through the application, and, unlike ridesharing, the passenger can exclude others from riding. Additionally, Uber’s policy
against ride solicitation162 further establishes a passenger’s control over the vehicle.163 In sum, since the passenger pays a fare, decides the destination, and
can exclude others from entering, an Uber passenger would have an objective
expectation of privacy just like a passenger in a taxi.
While Nevada has not specifically addressed privacy rights in taxicabs,
case law involving locations where an individual may have an expectation of
privacy provide a guide. For example, there is no expectation of privacy when
two employees are recorded when “talk[ing] too loudly” in the workplace.164
The Court reviewed several factual circumstances to determine whether there
was a subjective expectation of privacy, including the individual’s inability to
exclude others from a retail store, the ability of other employees to hear, and
the size of the store.165 Further, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a driver has no reasonable expectation of privacy for the bumper of their car because
the exterior of the car is open to public view and subject to visual inspection by
anyone.166 The Nevada Supreme Court has also held that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy for an individual engaged in sexual activity in a doorless stall in a public restroom because Fourth Amendment protection is not afforded to activities that a person knowingly exposes to the public.167 Conversepassenger requests it). Both statutes emphasize a passenger’s control over the vehicle by way
of restricting taxicab drivers from having control over the destination or additional passengers. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352, 361 (1967) (finding a public telephone
booth to be a temporarily private place and using a taxicab as an example for similar places
where an individual may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment); United States
v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that passenger has a reasonable expectation of privacy because the passenger, by paying a fare in a taxicab, has contracted the right
to exclude others from the car and determine its destination); United States v. Santiago, 950
F. Supp. 590, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing a passenger’s Fourth Amendment privacy
rights in a taxicab because in effect, the passenger area belongs to the passenger); Chapa,
729 S.W.2d at 728 (holding a passenger in a taxi had a reasonable expectation of privacy
because the passenger exercised a significant degree of control over the taxicab).
162
Driver Deactivation Policy, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/deactivation-policy/usmulti-lingual/en [https://perma.cc/5Q4G-S64Z] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (“To maintain the
transparency and safety of the Uber platform for all users, activities conducted outside of the
monitored system of the Uber app—like anonymous pickups—are prohibited.”).
163
In 2014, Uber introduced UberPool, a new service that allows for users to share rides to
similar destinations for a cheaper price. In this service, a Fourth Amendment analysis may
differ because with UberPool, a passenger does not have the same level of control over the
ride, lessening their reasonable expectation of privacy. See Announcing UberPool, supra
note 18.
164
Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (D. Nev. 1985).
165
Id. at 1264.
166
Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002).
167
Young v. State, 849 P.2d 336, 342 (Nev. 1993).
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ly, a passenger preserves reasonable privacy rights by entering an Uber with the
intention of shutting the door to separate oneself from the public.
However, passengers cannot expect total privacy because of the driver’s
presence. But the driver is a non-public service provider who must abide by the
passengers’ instructions;168 therefore, while passengers may not expect complete privacy, they may expect privacy from government surveillance during
the ride. Nevertheless, even if passengers have a reasonable expectation of privacy, it must be balanced against the extent and purpose behind the video recording.169
Not all government surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment.170 For
example, video recording public places is no more than documenting what can
be viewed by the naked eye.171 Thus, a passenger’s entry and exit from an Uber
is not subject to protection because it is open to visual and auditory observation. However, governmental recording of a passenger within the vehicle is
very different. Courts review the reasonableness of the governmental intrusion172 by balancing the intrusion against legitimate government interests.173
Courts have recognized the differing degrees of intrusion and have generally
held that a defendant has a reasonable expectation to be free of constant surveillance.174 Some of the government’s interests in having cameras in Uber vehicles would be to ensure the safety of the drivers and passengers and to provide identification of suspects if an incident occurred. While the government’s
goals in the taxi-camera debate were almost the same, one key difference is in
those debates, the government focused only on the safety of the driver, not the
passenger. Many courts acknowledge the legitimate public interest in preventing crime against taxicab drivers.175 The recent crimes against Uber passengers
and the several pending criminal cases would likely be enough to demonstrate
legitimate government interests in ensuring passenger safety as well as driver
safety. Therefore, the government’s interest in protecting both drivers and passengers in Uber vehicles may tip the scale in favor of the increased intrusion
inherent in the use of in-vehicle cameras.
By this analysis, if a passenger were only recorded for a minimal portion of
their ride, it would likely be considered a reasonable intrusion into the passenger’s privacy rights. But, the reasonable amount of time to record a passenger—without violating the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights—would be
168

NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8846 (2015).
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 2002).
170
United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991).
171
Id.
172
Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1204–05.
173
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004) (internal citation omitted).
174
United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987).
175
United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000); State v. White, 818 A.2d 361,
366 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002); People v. Abad, 771 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 2002).
169
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longer in an Uber compared to in a taxi, because the government’s main interest would be passenger safety, as opposed to solely driver-safety interests in
taxis. Uber should mirror taxi regulations and limit the amount of time surveillance is conducted. This would include recording the entry and exit of the passenger, the interior cabin once a passenger presses an SOS button in the application, and minimal recording in the event of a G-Force occurrence, meaning
sudden stops, swerving, and excess braking.176 First, as discussed supra, the
Fourth Amendment does not protect the surveillance of a passenger’s entry and
exit because it is already visible to the public. Second, pressing an SOS button
demonstrates the passenger’s consent to recording and presumably does not violate the driver’s rights because the driver is aware of this feature, and, in most
states, one party can consent to recording.177 Third, minimal recording in a GForce event promotes the government’s interest in the safety of the driver and
passenger, and the limited recording is not a significant intrusion on the passenger’s privacy rights.178 Further, additional deterrent measures could be added to advance the government’s goal, like a visual red light when the camera is
recording and posted signs explaining which portions of the ride may be recorded.
Additionally, to avoid any possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation,
Uber could give notice of video recording prior to a customer’s accepting a
ride. For example, when a user opens the Uber application to request a ride, an
identifying mark on the visual depiction of the closest vehicle would alert users
which vehicles feature video recording. Then, the customer would be prompted
to overtly accept that the vehicle has video recording. A notice warning may be
a win-win for both Uber and the state because more people may be inclined to
use Uber if there is video recording, especially intoxicated travelers or solo riders. Further, with gradual implementation, users who do not want to be recorded can still choose an Uber without a camera.

176

Michael A. Litschi, Video-Based Driver Risk Management Systems: Evaluating Effectiveness at Improving Transit Safety 5 (June 2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis, San José State
University).
177
See generally Letter from Christine M. Guerci-Nyhus to Yvette G. Moore, supra note
140. With increased technology, it is possible that new surveillance triggers may be even
more effective. For example, with Apple’s new iPhone 6 feature of no-touch voice activated
“Siri,” Uber’s application may be able to incorporate a similar feature where a voice signal
can trigger recording, like multiple uses of “no,” “stop,” or a yell or scream.
178
Litschi, supra note 176, at 44. Recording would be triggered when “atypical vehicle
movements occur, such as sudden braking or acceleration, swerving, sharp turns, or the impact of a collision.” Id. This information can then be used for training purposes, selfevaluation, or other data driven purposes. Id.; see also Letter from Christine M. GuerciNyhus to Yvette G. Moore, supra note 140, at 11. Further, recording these events can help
determine what happened during an accident or incident on the road. Uber has already begun
monitoring the movements of its drivers through their phones’ accelerometers. See Yadron
& Bowles, supra note 106.
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Ultimately, cameras are worth the constitutional and logistical hurdles because they safeguard passengers by deterring crime and providing identification
for investigations. Surveillance cameras are known to deter crime,179 and a visible camera in an Uber vehicle may allow passengers—and drivers—to think
twice before doing anything inappropriate in the vehicle. In-vehicle video recording can also help police solve disputes or crimes that may occur in the
course of a ride. Many taxi drivers and passengers already enjoy the benefits of
in-vehicle cameras, and despite the differences between taxis and Uber, the
goal of safe rides remains the same for both. In sum, this note suggests either
requiring constant video surveillance when a user requests an Uber, or allowing
limited video recording in three situations: (1) entry and exit of passengers, (2)
when a passenger pushes the SOS in-app button, and (3) when a G-Force event
has occurred.
C. Safety-Alert Buttons Should Be Available on the Uber App
In mid-2015, Uber unveiled its new SOS technology in India.180 The SOS
button connects users with local law enforcement almost instantaneously once
pressed.181 When a user enters the vehicle, the passenger’s phone displays the
driver information—name, vehicle type, and license plate number—and a map
display of the vehicle’s current location.182 The SOS button is located on the
home screen, and when users feel in danger, pressing the button will immediately connect the passenger to law enforcement—essentially speed dialing
911—and a real-time alert with the vehicle’s GPS location is sent directly to a
local police control room.183 According to Uber’s website, this alert will then
be “projected on a dedicated screen in the control room of local law enforcement which has been set up by Uber’s safety experts.”184 The SOS button was
beta-tested in Kolkata, but the program requires a collaborative effort between
the TNC and local law enforcement in order to be replicated in other cities.185
After similar reports of sexual assault in Chicago, Uber planned to integrate an

179

NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., EVALUATING THE USE OF PUBLIC
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION—A SUMMARY 2 (2011).
180
Introducing an Integrated SOS Alert Solution for Law Enforcement, UBER NEWSROOM
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://newsroom.uber.com/india/introducing-an-integrated-sos-alert-solu
tion-for-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/B4VZ-9VWY].
181
Id.
182
Alex Fitzpatrick, Uber Rolling Out ‘SOS Button’ That Helps Cops Track Cars, TIME
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://time.com/3841811/uber-sos-button-india [https://perma.cc/WPQ7-XC
GU].
183
Introducing an Integrated SOS Alert Solution for Law Enforcement, supra note 180.
184
Id.
185
Id.
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SOS button into its application servicing Chicago by 2015.186 However, the
SOS button has yet to expand beyond a few cities in India.
The SOS button should be featured and required in Uber’s application in
Nevada. Clearly the technology is available, as it has been implemented in India, so the only reason it hasn’t been integrated is likely because of the necessity for collaboration with local law enforcement, potential costs, and presumably, Uber’s refusal to exert what may be perceived as control over its drivers
because of the ongoing independent contractor and employee debate.
First, the control center and logistical hurdles to coordinate and implement
an SOS button costs money and requires cooperation and testing. The specific
SOS-button system Uber has designed requires a control center, with computers and employees, at a local law enforcement agency.187 This type of program
is very similar to proposed taxi-alert buttons, except that taxi panic buttons are
physically located in the taxicab for the driver while Uber’s button is in its application.188 In one private company’s proposal for a taxi-alert button, when the
button is pressed, GPS coordinates are routed to a central service location
where the information is quickly sent to local law enforcement, and an operator
can make a one-way call to the cab to assess the severity of the situation.189
This one-way call may not help in all incidents, but two-way communication
from the SOS button is possible because it would be conducted through the user’s cellphone. A few cities already require, or plan to require, similar, physical
panic buttons in their taxis and for-hire vehicles, and new safety-focused phone
applications offer similar panic button features, so the premise and need are
well established.190
Specifically, in Nevada, the NTA currently has a Public Safety Dispatch in
place that receives emergency calls and employs approximately twenty-five en186
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forcement agents.191 However, to implement the SOS button, Uber must still
collaborate with local law-enforcement agencies. This collaboration could be
achieved if the NTA or Uber worked directly with local law-enforcement agencies to accept Uber alerts in their control rooms. Trained police dispatch personnel would be the best option to respond to alerts and to relay the information
to law enforcement officers.
One problem is accidental usage of the SOS button. Since it is located on
the application and not a physical button, it may be easier to press accidentally
when entering the vehicle, throughout the ride, exiting, and—all too often in
Nevada—by those who are intoxicated. Since dispatch personnel are trained to
deal with accidental and false contacts, the instant phone connection once the
button is pressed—similar to the one-way call in proposed taxi panic buttons—
may provide dispatch with enough information to efficiently and effectively assess the situation and determine whether the alert is accidental or real.
Currently, Nevada taxicabs have panic buttons accessible only to the driver.192 As previously discussed, in implementing cameras in Uber, the pressing
of the panic button is one way the camera would be turned on.193 While there is
no pending legislation or public pressure for passenger-activated taxi panic buttons in Nevada, Uber’s voluntary implementation of such safety features could
put pressure on taxis to follow. Even though an SOS button may be the most
difficult and logistically complicated safety suggestion, Nevada should aggressively push for implementation of this technology to further protect tourists and
locals.
V. UBER HAS THE MONEY, SO WHAT’S STOPPING IT FROM IMPLEMENTING
THESE SUGGESTIONS?
One of the major reasons Uber has not already implemented these safety
features in almost all of its worldwide markets is allegedly the cost. However,
the Uber has access to safety-specific funds collected from rides, and the implementation of the safety features pay for themselves in a relatively short
amount of time. The benefits of introducing new safety features are worth the
expense and can greatly improve Uber’s public image.
Specifically regarding background checks, the excuse that they are expensive is mostly unsound. In Nevada, a criminal history check, without finger-
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prints, through the Nevada Repository costs $38.25,194 but if Uber follows the
same process as used by Nevada taxi companies, the background screening, including fingerprinting, costs $91.25 per applicant.195 Since Uber already pays a
large amount of money to commercial background companies, it is unlikely the
price per applicant with a private company is significantly less than the $100.00
fee for the process used by taxi companies.196 In conclusion, because of the scientific proof and public perception that fingerprint background checks provide
the most accurate review of an applicant, the legal pressure in regard to the already-practiced “safe-rides fee,” and the push from congressional representatives, Nevada should mandate Uber drivers be subject to fingerprint background checks.
Uber, and other TNCs, charge riders a “Safe Rides Fee.”197 The Safe Rides
Fee supports “the operation of the Uber platform, including a background
check process, development of safety features in the application, incident response and other operational costs.”198 This Safe Rides Fee varies, but, on average, it is $1.55 per ride.199 Originally, the Safe Rides Fee was designed to
fund background checks and twenty-four hours, seven days a week user service, but the varying fees around the country seem to reflect Uber’s assessment
of what cities are more dangerous and require more money to provide safe-
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guards.200 For example, during a southwest Las Vegas Uber ride in the early
morning hours of January 1, 2016, a passenger paid $9.81 for a less than four
mile, nine minute long ride, which included charges of $2.00 for base fare,
$4.34 for distance, $1.77 for time, and $1.70 for a “Safe Rides Fee.”201 Assuming it is a flat fee, the amount of money Uber collects from this fee is astounding. For example, the average Uber fare in mid-2015 was $13.36 per trip,202
and Uber’s website states there were 140 million rides in 2014.203 Assuming an
average Safe Rides Fee of $1.50 per ride, this amounts to $210 million annually.204 While this is not a specific or guaranteed amount reflecting what Uber has
actually collected from this fee, even a small percentage of this figure would
easily fund the more extensive background checks, data for video recording,
and funding to execute the SOS-button technology.
Since the implementation of this extra fee in 2014, several lawsuits have
sprung up around the country. Lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California in 2015 seek to hold Uber accountable for
charging users this fee while claiming to provide “industry leading” background checks.205 Another suit in the same district alleges that Uber materially
misrepresents to riders that it provides the “safest rides on the road.”206 These
lawsuits claim that the Safe Rides Fees are not used for biometric-based background checks, regular motor vehicle checks, driver safety education, or any inapplication safety features.207 After this note was initially written, Uber settled
two class-action lawsuits for $28.5 million for misleading customers on its
safety procedures and fees.208 Additionally, per the settlement, Uber agreed to
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“stop using certain ‘safety-related’ advertising language and would rename its
‘Safe Rides Fee’ as a ‘Booking Fee.’ ”209
If Uber implements more rigorous background checks and safety features,
it can avoid future lobbying and lawsuit costs. For example, as of 2014, Uber
spent over $650,000 lobbying in California and at least $60,000 in Colorado,
essentially to ensure that stricter background checks requirements did not pass
the legislatures.210 The legal costs associated with the lawsuits in California,
and future similar lawsuits, could exceed hundreds of thousands of dollars, if
not millions, if Uber is unsuccessful in this fight.211 Further, if Uber refuses to
improve its safety features, cities and countries may refuse to allow Uber services to enter their market or may remove pre-existing services from their markets.212
CONCLUSION
Uber’s fast growth and high profits are commendable, but it can only be
sustained if the company proactively protects its customers. By putting state
regulations and increased safety provisions in place, Uber’s goal of “safe rides,
safer cities”213 can be achieved. The recent California court rulings on Uber’s
safety claims and practices is a win for consumers, as the company’s safety advertising will no longer be misleading. But the major victory would come from
Uber living up to its promises of having “industry leading” background checks
and truly creating the safest experience for its consumers.
However, if Uber does not implement necessary safety initiatives on its
own, Nevada must be prepared to protect its unique population and consider
requiring these features as current regulations do not require important safeguards like “FBI or state-enhanced criminal background checks . . . drug testing
. . . [d]river training . . . [d]river physicals . . . [c]ameras in vehicles to ensure
driver and customer safety and surveillance . . . [and] [c]onspicuous markings
209
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on the vehicles for law-enforcement identification.”214 Ultimately, only time
will determine Uber’s ultimate success or failure in Nevada, but it is almost
guaranteed to be a wild ride.
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